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 WELFARE AND FOOD ASSISTANCE AT THE STATE
 AND SUB-STATE LEVEL: A FRAMEWORK
 FOR EVALUATING ECONOMIC AND
 PROGRAMMATIC CHANGES
 MAUREEN KILKENNY, HELEN H. JENSEN, STEVEN GARASKY, AND
 JENNIFER OLMSTED
 Welfare and food stamp program changes
 may affect local economies, and economic
 changes may affect local program partici-
 pation. In this paper we outline a model
 of these interactions. First we highlight key
 changes in the programs and report recent
 program and labor market participation pat-
 terns in metro and non-metro portions of
 the Midwest and the state of Iowa. Then
 we describe computable general equilibrium
 (CGE) model equations that formalize the
 types of choices being made and discuss the
 regional economic impacts that can be simu-
 lated. In the process, we raise several related
 research questions.
 The goal of welfare reform is to decrease
 household dependency on transfer payments
 from government. States have been encour-
 aged to tailor programs to their own cir-
 cumstances two ways: by waivers (prior to
 1996) and by the conversion of the previ-
 ously "need-based" intergovernmental trans-
 fers to blocked grants (since 1996). Waivers
 gave states the authority to administer their
 own programs, and blocking means they must
 do so with a limited budget. The requisite for
 federal funding under the Personal Respon-
 sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
 Act (PRWORA) of 1996 is that states require
 able-bodied welfare recipients to make the
 transition from welfare to work or risk losing
 benefits. It is also the first act since the orig-
 inal Social Security Act of 1935 to impose a
 time limit on dependency. Ideally, the reform
 encourages increased labor market participa-
 t on by low income households. Other ways
 that households can become independent
 (without changing family composition) are
 via increased child support payments being
 sought and received by single parents, or by
 incurring debt.
 Since the passing of the PRWORA, the
 USDA has been investigating the impact
 of devolution on the Food Stamp Program
 (FSP). A key question for the USDA is
 whether the fiscal burden on the food stamp
 program will increase as state assistance
 programs become more stringent (Kuhn,
 LeBlanc, and Gundersen). If there is a
 national or state recession, or as needy fam-
 ilies hit the state-mandated time limits, food
 stamp use may increase as participation in
 welfare programs decline.
 Historically, enrollments in both welfare
 (AFDC) and FSP changed together over
 time. Recent trends are similar. However, it
 is not yet clear why FSP rolls have con-
 tinued to decline with those on Temporary
 Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) (Wal-
 lace and Blank). The parallel reductions in
 caseloads are due in part to the nationwide
 economic expansion since 1993. The Council
 of Economic Advisors (CEA) estimated that
 31-44% of the reduction in program partic-
 ipation has been due to the booming econ-
 omy, while 14-30% of the reductions appear
 to be due to state-specific changes in the
 programs.
 There may also be rural/urban as well as
 state-specific factors. According to the Rural
 Policy Research Institute (RUPRI): "While
 caseloads have gone down in rural areas,
 labor force participation among the rural
 poor has not increased. Between 1992 and
 1997, labor force participation among the
 poor increased by 8% in urban areas and 4%
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 Table 1. Midwest Program and Labor Force Participation, by Location, 1996
 Metro 72.1% Non-metro 27.9%
 Participation Work Not work Work Not work Totals
 T = 0, F = 0 28.6% 11.7% 12.7% 5.1% 57.6%
 T = 0, F = 1 5.3% 4.9% 3.9% 2.0% 16.0%
 T= 1, F = 0 0.5% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 1.3%
 T = 1, F = 1 6.7% 14.5% 1.5% 2.4% 25.1%
 % in region 56.4% 43.6% 65.2% 34.8% 100.0%
 Data: SIPP 1996 Wave 1 (weighted); householders age eighteen to sixty-five years with non-transfer income less than or equal to 130% poverty.
 Note: T = 1 if participate in income support program, 0 otherwise; F = 1 if participate in Food Stamp program, 0 otherwise.
 in suburban areas, but did not change in rural
 areas" (emphasis in original).
 Since attaining economic self-sufficiency in
 rural areas is likely to be more difficult
 because welfare recipients in rural areas must
 search a larger geographic area for job oppor-
 tunities, it may be that persons who would
 difficulty finding work in any market will
 not choose to reside in rural areas. Thus,
 rural labor force participation rates may be
 higher because only those most likely to be
 employed select the area.
 Data on the Midwest are consistent with
 the hypothesis that the potentially dependent
 Midwestern poor self-select metropolitan
 residential locations (and avoid non-metro
 ones). Table 1 summarizes Midwest pro-
 gram and labor force participation rates
 using 1996 Survey of Income and Program
 Participation (SIPP) data. A larger propor-
 tion of the Midwest's non-metro poor aged
 eighteen to sixty-five years were working
 in 1996, compared to metro (65.2% versus
 56.4%). Chi-squared tests of the dependence
 of labor force and/or program participation
 on metro/non-metro residence location show
 that (a) poor Midwest non-metro households
 participate in labor markets more, while
 (b) poor Midwest metro households partici-
 pate more in TANF and FSP than expected,
 all significant at a = 0.001.
 Focusing on a particular state's eco-
 nomic and program changes may help iden-
 tify the state-specific effects on caseloads.
 Throughout the 1990s, Midwestern states
 have enjoyed the benefits of a healthy econ-
 omy. In Iowa since 1995, the statewide unem-
 ployment rate has remained well below
 the nationwide 5% rate. This statewide
 economic success, however, has an uneven
 geographic distribution. County level unem-
 ployment rates in Iowa in 1996 ranged from
 2.1% (Warren) to 8.0% (Adams), with the
 five coun ies having the highest nemploy-
 ment r tes being predominately rural coun-
 ties (Institute for Economic Research).
 In 1993 the State of Iowa implemen ed
 reforms under a waiver to create the Family
 Investment Program (FIP). The FIP's goals of
 helping program recipients leave poverty and
 become economically self-supporting parallel
 the intent of the PRWOR Act (Iowa Depart-
 ment of Human Services 1996). The FIP
 merged and coordinated several existing pro-
 grams, and tied support for job training, edu-
 cation, child care, and transportation more
 directly to income transfers. Iowa has had to
 change its FIP very little to meet the current
 federal guidelines.
 Caseloads in Iowa for the AFDC/FIP and
 FSP both peaked around the time of the
 implementation of the FIP waiver (1993-
 94) (figure 1). After that, FIP participation
 has declined more than FSP enrollments.
 The proportion of metro versus non-metro
 counties cases has been about the same
 for AFDC/FIP and FSP during this decade
 (about half the cases in each program are in
 Iowa's ten metro counties).
 What factors have contributed to the
 reductions in Iowa's caseloads? Analyses of
 recidivism among FIP exiters in Iowa during
 the 1993-96 period indicate that living in a
 metro area in Iowa increases the probabil-
 ity of staying off of FIP (Keng, Garasky, and
 Jensen). This suggests that it is easier to get
 (and stay) off welfare if one lives in a metro
 area in Iowa. Among economic and income
 variables, both wage income and child sup-
 port had a positive and statistically signifi-
 cant effect on staying off of public assistance.
 Nearly 90% of those leaving FIP and return-
 ing within six months received FSP benefits
 during the transition period. For these cases,
 FSP was an alternative safety net.
 The findings about Iowa are consistent with
 what has been reported in nationwide stud-
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 Figure 1. AFDC (TANF) and food stamp caseloads in Iowa 1990-98
 ies. Most studies of former welfare recipi-
 ents have found that between half and three-
 quarters of parents are employed after they
 leave the rolls (Parrott). However, wages are
 typically below $8 per hour, and often below
 $6 per hour. As a result, earnings levels of
 exiters are still well below poverty. Recent
 national research also shows that the proba-
 bility of successfully leaving public assistance
 varies with personal characteristics (educa-
 tion, job experience, age, ethnicity) and fam-
 ily composition (marital status, number of
 dependents) (cf., Moffit, Sandefur and Cook).
 The implication of these facts and figures
 for a state/substate CGE model for pro-
 gram evaluation is that the model should
 (a) distinguish households by personal char-
 acteristics and family composition, (b) be
 able to simulate either higher or lower rural
 (compared to urban) labor market and pro-
 gram participation, (c) simultaneously model
 (endogenize) earned income and program
 participation, (d) distinguish rural from urban
 labor markets, and (e) track transfers of
 child support as well as changes in household
 indebtedness.
 Structural Equations for a State/Sub-State
 CGE Model
 A CGE model is a system of simultaneous
 equations representing the choice problems
 of all agent types in an economic system:
 as producers, consumers, labor suppliers, wel-
 fare program participants, governments, etc.
 Most of this interr gional CGE model of
 Iowa is described elsewhere (Kilkenny 1993,
 Kilkenny and Otto, Kilkenny 1999a). In this
 paper we present new structural equations
 for modeling welfare and food stamp pro-
 grams. The key behavioral hypothesis is that
 households will choose (a) whether or not to
 work, (b) to work locally or to commute, and
 ( ) to participate in programs depending on
 which set offers the highest current dispos-
 able income (see also Keane and Moffitt).
 Households are distinguished by fam-
 ily composition (married or single head,
 numbers of dependents), age (under or over
 sixty-five), and other program-relevant char-
 acteristics. All non-institutionalized under
 sixty-five householders are modeled as poten-
 tial suppliers of differentiated types of labor:
 service, operator/farm/unskilled, clerk, craft,
 technical, professional, or executive. There
 is significant variation across sectors in
 demand for the different types of labor. The
 occupational composition of each sector's
 workforce is formalized in the CGE model
 by a fixed-coefficient table that dis/aggregates
 occupational types, by sector, in the same
 way that industrial goods are aggregated
 into composite capital goods for each sector.
 Regional demand for labor is the product of
 the sectoral demand for labor times each sec-
 tor's occupation mix.
 Each type of labor supplied by each house-
 hold also chooses between working locally or
 com uting. This discrete choice problem is
 modeled using a modified Kuhn-Tucker con-
 dition for allow for corner solutions, in proba-
 bility erms, benchmarked to base year obser-
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Thu, 13 Oct 2016 15:49:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 652 August 2000 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
 vations. Gross labor income (YW) if one
 works is from either the local labor market
 or the market within commute range: YW =
 (YL, L + Yc - C) (household subscripts
 dropped for simplicity). Work locally (L = 1)
 would be chosen if earnings are higher in the
 local labor market than as a commuter, net
 of commuting costs (CC): L ( Y - Yc -
 CC) > 0. Otherwise, commute (C = 1) to
 work. This is guaranteed by constraints that
 (a) L and C are non-negative, (b) all non-
 zero L are equated to unity by L = LIL, and
 (c) L + C = 1. The choice of which labor mar-
 ket to participate in depends on opportuni-
 ties, wages, and remoteness. The farther away
 one is from an alternative labor market, the
 higher the commute costs, and the less likely
 one would be to commute.
 Earned income is compared to eligi-
 ble transfer income to determine whether
 and how much a household participates in
 welfare programs. Transfer income (YT)
 adds to total net disposable household
 income, given the participation choices
 (i = F, T contained in [0, 1]), at the
 stipulated benefit levels per household
 (HHThh,): YThh Fhh hh, F + Thh
 HHThh, T. Thus, benefits are simultaneously
 determined with the earned income level for
 each type of household. A logistic function
 is calibrated to reproduce the participation
 choice variables Fhh and Thh at observed
 base-year probabilities.
 The benefit levels per household type are the
 product of eligibility criteria times the stipu-
 lated annual amounts per household by type
 (Committee on Ways and Means). For exam-
 ple, HHThh, F = E1F E2, - 12 - GMAXhh -
 0.3. Y1hh, F), where ElF and E2F are the 0/1
 eligibility criteria with respect to net (ElF) and
 gross (E2F) income; GMAX is the maximum
 FSP transfer, and Y1F is the household's ref-
 erence income for FSP. Y1F is earned (YW)
 plus unearned income (N) which includes
 child support payments received; plus the
 benefits from other programs (HHThh, T +
 HHThh, other), net of the standard deduction
 ($134/month) and household-specific deduc-
 tions (DCTNhh): Yhh, F = .8 YWhh +
 Nhh + HHThh, T + HHThh, other- 12 134 -
 12 DCTNhh.. Note that the amount of support received under the TANF program
 (HHThh, T) enters the determination of eligi-
 bility and the level of FSP, formalizing one
 of the avenues for cross-program linkages. If
 welfare support (HHThh, T) declines, eligibil-
 ity and demand for FSP support (HHThh, F)
 may increase.
 A household is eligible for food stamps
 [Elhh, F(and E2hh, F) = 1] if their refer-
 ence income level Y1hh, F (and Y2hh, F) does
 not exceed the eligibility limit(s) M1hh, F
 (and M2hh, F). For example, Elhh, F(Mlhh, F -
 Ylhh, F) > 0 returns the non-negative
 declared variable Elhh, F positive if the ref-
 erence (counted) income is smaller than the
 limit, and zero otherwise. Non-zero eligibility
 variables are normalized to unity by divid-
 ing them by themselves. The many other
 household-specific equations (not included
 here to conserve space) determine the second
 FSP eligibility criterion, the benefit levels
 for TANF, and the multiple TANF eligibility
 criteria.
 Households choose to work (Whh = 1)
 only if work income (YW) net of commuting
 costs (CC . C) exceeds transfers (YT) plus
 unearned income (N): W - (YW + CC - C -
 YT - N) > 0; otherwise, W = 0 (hh sub-
 scripts dropped for simplicity). In sum, the
 model should simulate the simultaneous deci-
 sion by each household type to participate in
 transfer programs (T, F) and to work locally,
 commute, or not at all (L or C, and W).
 Earnings are endogenously determined with
 respect to occupation-specific labor demand
 by sectors across regions.
 The CGE framework strength is that it
 highlights the circular flow of income from
 production (and/or transfers) to consump-
 tion, and back again. Another innovation in
 our state/substate CGE model for program
 evaluation concerns household expenditure:
 preferences are explicitly non-homothetic,
 and parameterization is not household-type
 specific. Engel's Law is the widely docu-
 mented phenomenon that as income rises, the
 share of consumer expenditure on necessities
 falls, and the share spent on luxuries rises.
 For this model, we choose an approximation
 of the "almost ideal demand system" recom-
 mended by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980),
 called the Working-Leser demand model.
 Expenditure shares are defined explicitly as a
 function of income:
 = Sc, hh = 0c + Ic log YDhh
 where subscript c indexes category of expen-
 diture, subscript hh refers to household type,
 Sc, hh is the share of household type hh's
 expenditure on c, Pc and Qc denote the price
 and demanded quantity of c, respectively,
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 Figure 2. Expenditure shares
 and YDhh denotes the household's dispos-
 able income (gross of transfers and net of
 taxes and inter-household transfers). Figure 2
 shows the Engel functions given prelimi-
 nary estimates of oa and 3c using consumer
 expenditure survey data. Consumer expendi-
 ture survey data are well known to be prob-
 lematic with respect to the measurement of
 household income and thus saving/dissaving.
 The main pattern, however, is clear: when
 saving and contributions to social insurance
 are expenditure items, they are luxuries and
 other items are necessities.
 Thus, this model will simulate a decrease
 (increase) in net saving as household incomes
 fall (rise). The formulation is an important
 point of departure for dynamic modeling
 of welfare reform. Also, while some low-
 income households in dissaving mode are
 retirees, consuming out of their accumulated
 stock of wealth, others are accumulating debt.
 Both types of dissaving, however, reduce the
 amount of loanable funds available for phys-
 ical capital investment. Both affect the sec-
 toral composition of aggregate demand, and
 thus regional employment.
 Typical modeling of final demand in CGE
 models relies on budget shares that are spe-
 cific to each household type, which do not
 change regardless of changes in the level of
 income of households in the type. This ex-ante
 rigidity is undesirable in a model in which
 the movement into/out of poverty is a key
 endogenous feature. It can lead to simulating
 larger and larger household indebtedness as
 households' incomes rise. In contrast, this
 model's demand parameters (a- and P) are
 not household-type specific. A single demand
 function can be used to generate unique
 household budget allocations for any endoge-
 nously determined income level. This makes
 it possible to disaggregate households accord-
 ing to criteria that, while very relevant to pro-
 gram participation and eligibility, are exoge-
 nous to the state of the economy.
 Changes in the Economy or Programs
 The CGE framework described above may
 be used evaluate a recession in the non-farm
 economy, coupled with a change in the state's
 budget. During a non-farm recession, the
 employment of some occupations will decline
 relatively more than others, given intra- and
 interstate labor mobility and the concomi-
 tant sticky wages. More metro as well as non-
 metro households will become eligible for
 transfers. State tax revenues at the initial tax
 rates will decline.
 Under the PRWORA, the state's receipt
 of intergovernmental transfers for TANF is
 fixed. Thus, during a recession the state must
 either raise taxes, reduce temporary assis-
 tance, or reallocate spending. The first strat-
 egy is progressive, the second is regressive,
 and the third is unpredictable. A progressive
 strategy will shift the composition of aggre-
 gate demand toward necessities; a regressive
 strategy will shift aggregate demand toward
 luxuries.
 Shifts in the necessity/luxury composition
 of aggregate demand will have different
 sub-state effects. All types of places, rural,
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 urban, and metro, offer necessities, but not
 all types of places offer luxuries. Central
 Place Theory posits that goods and services
 produced at high economies of scale, pur-
 chased infrequently, or for which the thresh-
 hold price is high, are generally only available
 in metropolitan locations (see DiPasquale
 and Wheaton). These are called "Central
 Places" in part because they serve cus-
 tomers from their surrounding non-metro
 areas. Metro areas will suffer more than
 proportionately from decreases in household
 incomes in the state, as spending decreases
 relatively on normal and luxury goods, com-
 pared to spending on necessities. These out-
 comes have been demonstrated using the
 Fiscal SAM developed for this CGE model
 (Kilkenny 1999b).
 Summary and Questions for
 Further Research
 This paper motivated and introduced a
 specific elaboration of a substate CGE
 model for the evaluation of safety net pro-
 grams. The empirical evidence indicates that
 economic opportunity, metro/non-metro loca-
 tion, and household composition are criti-
 cal determinants of welfare (in)dependence.
 This CGE thus distinguishes households by
 composition, has an explicit spatial, sec-
 toral, and occupational composition of labor
 demand, and jointly determines program
 and labor market (commute/not) participa-
 tion choices. Furthermore, consumer demand
 reflects Engel's Law. Given the different
 sectoral mix between metro and non-metro
 substate regions, this model can simulate dif-
 ferential substate impacts due to changes in
 the economy and/or programs.
 In the process of specifying the general
 equilibrium model we confronted a number
 of yet unanswered questions. Some must be
 answered before we can finish calibrating the
 CGE model described above. The answers
 to the other questions will likely inspire yet
 another level of analysis. To calibrate the
 existing model, we must delineate the labor
 markets areas within the state (using the
 BEA's Economic Areas, for example) and
 then measure potential commuting costs. We
 must document and calibrate regional pur-
 chase coefficients. We must also account for
 interregional flows of child support payments
 within and outside the state. We need to find
 better data on household income, exp ndi-
 ture, and (dis)saving, then estimate demand
 function parameters. And we must estimate
 the probabilities of the three discrete choice
 problems for households.
 To proceed to the next level of analysis, we
 should also address the following questions.
 How do the time limits on welfare b nefits
 affect the decisions to participate in TANF
 and/or work? Do households "bank" TANF
 eligibility? Which adjustment(s) will state
 governments make during recessions: raise
 taxes, lower transfers, reallocate resources
 across programs, or spend down surpluses? Is
 there a link between the PRWORA reforms
 and the recent increases in household debt?
 Welfare reform may well have induced sig-
 nificant changes in the intertemporal alloca-
 tion choices of both households and state
 governments. We will need to understand
 these changes to fully evaluate the new
 programs.
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